Good Intentions - Bad Results: The Economy Pastoral and America\u27s Disadvantaged by Williams, Walter E.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 2
Issue 1 Symposium on the Economy Article 12
February 2014
Good Intentions - Bad Results: The Economy
Pastoral and America's Disadvantaged
Walter E. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter E. Williams, Good Intentions - Bad Results: The Economy Pastoral and America's Disadvantaged, 2 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics &
Pub. Pol'y 179 (1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol2/iss1/12
GOOD INTENTIONS-BAD RESULTS: THE
ECONOMY PASTORAL AND AMERICA'S
DISADVANTAGED
WALTER E. WILLIAMS*
Morality and the character of relationships among men
are rightfully a concern to all of us, especially the Church.
To their credit, American churches have been at the fore-
front of care and concern for. humankind both abroad and at
home. Our churches have played a pivotal role in the organi-
zation of charity; in the sixties, they awakened Americans to
the plight of disenfranchised minorities; American churches
have often been the critical difference between starvation and
life in many parts of the world.
Through most of its history in the United States, the
Church has recognized the morality of capitalism, private
property rights, voluntary exchange and the dispersion of
power that results from limited government. In recent years,
church leadership has become increasingly hostile to basic
principles of capitalism. Church leaders, in their well-in-
tended effort to pursue what they see as divine mandate,
have ignored the strong ethical dimensions of capitalism. The
National Conference of Catholic Bishops' "Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy" is an excel-
lent example of increasing hostility to capitalism, our form of
social organization.
Since the bishops' letter attacks capitalism and its attrib-
utes, such as private property and voluntary exchange, this
article will first highlight the basic features of capitalism.
What does capitalism imply about man's relationship to man
and about his responsibility as steward of the earth's scarce
resources?
Capitalism
Capitalism and free enterprise are synonyms which "re-
fer to a system in which people have private-property rights
to production and consumption goods.1 Private property
* John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of Economics, George Ma-
son University.
1. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETI-
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rights are the dominant distinguishing feature of capitalism.
Private property rights refer to "an assignment of exclusive
authority to some individual to choose any use of the goods
deemed to be his private property. In other words, the 'own-
ers', who are assigned the right to make the choice, have an
unrestricted right to the choice of use of specific goods."'
To say that a person has private property rights means
that he, and no one else, has the right to make use of that
property in ways which are not prohibited. If I own leather,
my private property right to that good means that I can make
shoes, handbags and belts out of it. Still, it does not mean
that I can use the leather in any way. If I hit you with a
leather belt or throw a shoe through your window, I violate
your property rights in your body or window and deny you
your choice to use your goods in a nonprohibited manner.
The ownership of private property necessarily implies
that people will voluntarily exchange possessions, consenting
to these exchanges before their occurrences. An exchange
represents a transfer of property rights. When we purchase
coffee, in effect, we tell the grocer, "I will transfer my au-
thority (or title) to use three dollars to you if you transfer
your authority to use a one-pound can of coffee to me." Both
buying and selling are acts that transfer property rights, and
the transfer is 'voluntary' if all parties to the exchange have
given their consent to the transaction.
When people voluntarily enter exchanges, both parties,
in their own estimation, improve their welfare. Were this not
the case, we could not explain why one would voluntarily give
up his rights to continue to hold, as in our example, the three
dollars. Obviously, when the transfer occurs, we can safely in-
fer that the ownership of the coffee rather than of the three
dollars was more pleasing to the buyer. Likewise, owning the
three dollars rather than the coffee was more pleasing to the
seller.
Of course, not all transfers of property are voluntary;
some entail an involuntary component. Theft involves this in-
voluntary transfer since at least one of the parties does not
consent to the transfer: the thief agrees to the transfer, but
the victim does not. In involuntary exchanges, one person's
gain comes at the expense of another's loss.
TION, COERCION, AND CONTROL 10 (1977).
2. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816,
818 (1965).
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Alternative Forms of Property Rights
Most discussions ignore the social consequences of differ-
ent forms of property rights. We can contrast the differences
by comparing private property rights to public or communal
property rights.
The distinguishing features of a system of private prop-
erty rights are ownership, transferability and excludability.
Excludability is the right to exclude others from using the
resource. In contrast to the private property right of exclud-
ability, communal rights recognize the rights of all members
of the "community" to use its resources. No one can be ex-
cluded. The working arrangement for a system of communal
rights is that neither the state nor its citizens can exclude
others from using a given resource. Modern examples of
communal rights include rights to use city sidewalks, "public"
roads, hunting grounds and air. In some countries, the rights
to till the land and to cultivate and harvest crops are com-
munally held.
Systems of communal property rights have shortcomings.
First, these systems fail to encourage individuals to consider
the effect of their use of a given resource on others. Second,
they breed neither concern for the future value of a resource
nor a recognition of how present use of a resource will im-
pact that value.-
The world offers many examples of the consequences of
communal rights. In the United States, hunting rights to buf-
falo were communally held and led to near extinction of the
buffalo at a time when cows (privately held property) flour-
ished. Fishing rights in the ocean are communally held by all
nations. Consequently, several fish species, as well as whales,
are threatened with extinction. Communally held hunting
rights in the Gulf of St. Lawrence led to brutal capture tech-
niques and near extermination of seals. Communally held
rights to land are an important factor in soil erosion, defores-
tation and overgrazing in many parts of Africa, problems
which have aggravated its recent drought.
One need not question the morality of communal rights,
or propose an alternative to them in order to recognize their
critical flaw. No no one can lay claim to or benefit from using
a resource in a way which makes it more valuable now and in
the future. The individual whaler who decides not to har-
3. Alchian & Demsetz, The Property Right Pardigm, J. ECON. HIST.,
Mar. 1973, at 17, 19-22.
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poon a- baby whale so that she will mature, become pregnant,
and thereby raise the value of the herd, receives little or no
benefit from his actions. In fact, the whaler's prudent behav-
ior, not emulated by his competitors, will make him worse off
because he provides more whales to his competitors.
A system of communal rights inherently includes a
strong incentive to overuse resources. Differences in the be-
havior of whalers and ranchers, for example, help to explain
how communal property rights encourage overuse of re-
sources. Whalers do not own the whales that they hunt and
kill them without concern for conservation of the whale. On
the other hand, ranchers do not slaughter pregnant cows;
their current actions do take into account the future value
and size of their herd. The differences in the behavior of
ranchers and whalers cannot be explained by the argument
that ranchers are somehow a more moral people than whal-
ers, but rather by the fact that ranchers have private prop-
erty rights to their cows. The rancher personally benefits
from his prudent actions and sacrifices that conserve and im-
prove the future value of his herd. In addition, he is person-
ally accountable for his actions that waste or lower the future
value of his herd.
There are few differences in resource misallocation
whether government owns and controls a resource or
whether it is communally owned. Examples of government
ownership and control of resources include the postal service,
national parks, and many other natural and manmade re-
sources in the United States. Government is an abstraction,
and as such, it does not control and make decisions about re-
source usage. Government employees, such as politicians, bu-
reaucrats and field representatives, make decisions.
When government employees make decisions, whether in
good or in bad faith, the fact of business is that they neither
bear the full cost nor reap the full benefit of their actions. If
the owners of Disneyland Park ignore maintenance of
grounds and facilities, or performance of duties by employ-
ees, or proper pricing and accounting procedures, they face
direct, certain and swift personal penalties. Poor service leads
to decreased patronage of the park; decreased patronage
yields lower profits. Lower profits signal that Wall Street in-
vestors will abandon Disneyland. Disneyland would go out of
business, or its low-valued stock would lead to the firing of
managers or make Disneyland ripe for a "takeover" by some
other enterprise which, can more ably manage the facility.
Government ownership includes no such system of re-
[Vol. 2
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wards and penalties. After all, what does a bureaucrat at the
Interior Department lose when he charges the wrong fee,
fails to detect workers shirking duties and otherwise inappro-
priately manages the resource? At worst he's fired, but he
risks no personal wealth as does a private owner of resources
in similar circumstances. The general citizenry bears the
losses from inappropriate resource use by bureaucrats and
their subordinates.
Both private owners and government employees have
self-interest and seek to accumulate wealth through their
work, but they realize that goal by very different means. The
comparison of privately owned liquor stores with govern-
ment-owned liquor stores provides a good example. In pri-
vately owned liquor stores, owners attempt to operate their
establishments during all hours permitted by law. They pre-
fer to provide customer services well into the evening, on
holidays and on Sundays if permitted. Through higher sales
and hence higher profits, private store owners personally
reap the benefits from greater customer satisfaction.
Contrast such a reward and punishment structure, and
the behavior it induces, to liquor stores that the government
owns and controls. Since the benefits of greater sales and in-
come do not accrue to government employees of liquor
stores, they seek personal satisfaction in non-monetary forms,
such as shorter work days, shorter work weeks and more
work holidays. Furthermore, they have less incentive to be-
come knowledgeable about wines and whiskeys, not because
they are less intelligent than private workers and owners, but
because they reap no benefit from learning about their trade.
The world is full of similar examples. The point is that
under government ownership and control, pursuit of self-in-
terest often comes at the expense of customers. Under private
ownership and control, manager and worker pursuit of self-
interest is in harmony with the interests of the customer.
Government need not actually own property in order to
create the effects of government ownership of property. Gov-
ernment taxation of property can produce the same effects.
The system of taxation represents partial government owner-
ship of property in that it limits the uses of property. If a
worker earns $2,000 each month, and the government im-
poses a twenty-five percent tax on those earnings, the worker
does not have private property rights to $500. He cannot em-
ploy the value of his labor services in any way he wishes. Pre-
dictably, when a person is allowed to control less of his labor,
he will labor less. Similarly, when government taxes any form
11)851
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of property, labor, machines, land or savings, people will
have less inducement to accumulate, improve and husband
the world's scarce resources.
The Bishops' Attack
The bishops' letter is as thorough an attack on private
property and personal liberty as any envisioned by a dictato-
rial regime. Contempt for personal liberty is the tone that
pervades the document which states: "Everyone has a legiti-
mate claim on economic benefits to at least the minimum
level necessary for the social protection of human dignity." 4
The bishops define their standard of human rights: "In the
first place stand the rights to 'food, clothing, shelter, rest,
medical care. ''5
If the bishops were wishing, they would be on solid com-
mon ground with most Americans who also wish their fellow
man the barest of essentials. However, the assertion that
food, clothing and shelter are rights, is itself a violation of the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution of the United
States.
The violation of human liberty espoused by the bishops
is inevitable when we acknowledge that government has no
resources of its very own. We must acknowledge that the only
way government can give one American a dollar is to confis-
cate, under intimidation, threats and coercion, a dollar from
some other American.'
For one American to have a government-established
right to food, shelter and clothing, some other American
must be forcibly denied the right to the fruits of his labor.
When the bishops say that one American has the right to a
dollar, they imply that some other American does not have
the right to one of the dollars he earns. That is a necessary,
logical consequence of the fact that government has no re-
sources of its own.
The bishops should not be allowed to skirt the moral
4. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy para. 78 (First Draft 1984), reprinted in 14 ORIGINS
337 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Pastoral Letter]. See National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy para. 83 (Sec-
ond Draft 1985), reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 257 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Second Draftl.
5. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 79. See Second Draft, supra
note 4, para. 84
6. For the reader who thinks these terms are excessive, let him tell
the IRS he does not want his earnings taken and given to someone else.
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question of whether one group of Americans should have the
power to use government to take the property of one person
and then give that property to another to whom it does not
belong. In private conduct, when A uses force to confiscate
B's property and then gives it to X, we call it theft, armed
robbery or extortion, and we call X a recipient of stolen
goods. Most Americans would morally condemn such con-
duct regardless of the needs of X. We must ask whether pri-
vate behavior that has been deemed immoral suddenly be-
comes moral because it is done collectively, or whether
immoral behavior becomes moral because it is legal. Finally,
we must consider whether immoral behavior becomes moral
because a majority of people have deemed it so. 7
We all recognize that, as Thomas Paine said,
"[G]overnment, even at its best state, is but a necessary
evil." 8 To preserve human liberty and to promote an orderly
society, we need government. Government must prevent our
fellow man, at home and abroad, from forcefully taking
someone else's property; we need government to enforce
contracts and adjudicate disputes. Government may also be
required to undertake other functions such as road, power
and highway construction. In other words, government may
be necessary to provide for what the Framers of the Constitu-
tion called the general welfare. By general welfare, they
meant those things that would benefit all Americans. All
Americans benefit by the nation's having an army, navy and
air force. In contrast, individual Americans benefit from gov-
ernment programs such as agricultural crop subsidies, food
stamps and corporate bailouts.
Frederic Bastiat, the nineteenth century philosopher-
economist, proposed the following test for moral govern-
ment: "See if the law takes from some person what belongs
to them and gives it to other persons to whom it does not
belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at the expense of
another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do without
committing a crime." 9
Many call it charity for the government to provide for
the poor, sick and elderly. Such a label perverts the meaning
7. Sometimes the response to these questions is, "We must have
some form of government taxation (confiscation) to provide for the na-
tional defense, courts, roads and power projects." Notice that such a re-
sponse uses legitimate government functions to justify illegitimate govern-
ment functions.
8. T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE 65 (I. Kramnick ed. 1980) (1st ed. 1776).
9. F. BASTIAT, THE LAW 21 (1981).
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of charity. Charity implies voluntary acts of conscience. Our
government performs acts of coercion that are better de-
scribed as legalized theft.
Confusion and Demagoguery Over the Sources of Income
The bishops' letter is rich with attacks on private prop-
erty rights and individual wealth accumulation, and it fre-
quently contradicts itself. The bishops, in mincing their sup-
port for private property, say, "This support of private
property right does not mean that any individual, group, or-
ganization, or nation has the right to unlimited accumulation
of wealth. . . . [T]he right to own must bow to the higher
principles of stewardship and the common use of the goods
of creation."' 10 The bishops add, "We believe the moment
has come to examine in greater depth the need for true jus-
tice in the economic sphere, so that the poor in our country
and the world will benefit more fully from God's gifts.""
In most discussions, including the bishops' letter, we talk
of income and wealth as being "distributed" or, to use the
bishops' term, as a "gift" from God. Such an outlook sug-
gests that differences in income and wealth between people
and countries result from unfair practices of a racist, a sexist,
an imperialist or a multinationalist "dealer" or distributor.
According to this view, social justice demands that we use
force to take dollars away from the person who has been
"dealt" too many and that we then give dollars to the person
"dealt" too few; in other words, there has to be a redistribu-
tion of income. Similarly, if income and wealth are viewed'as
"gifts" from God, the fact that one person has a large sum of
money and another person has little or no money suggests
that somebody stole God's gifts. Therefore, social justice de-
mands that we use government to take "gifts" away from
those with too many and return them to their "original"
owners.
While the bishops are not as explicit as I, their reasoning
reflects a gross misunderstanding about the sources of in-
come and wealth. Most men are not "dealt" their income and
wealth nor is their income a gift. Most individuals earn in-
come and wealth through productive activity either as indi-
viduals or in groups such as partnerships, cooperatives or cor-
10. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 121. See Second Draft, supra
note 4, para. 113.
11. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, outline.
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porations. In a free society, those who please their fellow
men often acquire wealth. In fact, the quantity of income and
wealth is a fairly good measure of how one has succeeded in
pleasing his fellow man.
The most dominant feature of the capitalist system is its
orientation toward pleasing the common man. Capitalist soci-
ety is not utopia; but despite its critics and detractors, there
are several unchallengeable attributes of the system. It was
with the rise of capitalism that man treated his fellow man
more humanely and that the common man became less sub-
ject to arbitrary actions by the strong. Women received bet-
ter treatment. Criminals were punished more humanely. The
insane and indigent were treated with more compassion.
Also, the world's greatest philanthropic organizations, such
as the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie Foundations rose with
capitalism.
Another important, humane feature of capitalism, com-
pletely ignored by its critics, is that capitalism provided for
peaceable accumulation of wealth. In the pre-capitalist days,
men conquered and seized property in order to gain material
wealth. Warriors captured people and land. They built and
sustained empires by looting and plundering. The nobility
used force to loot, to conscript and to tax as a means to pri-
vate wealth.
Capitalism enabled men to become wealthy, not by seiz-
ing their neighbor's property but by diligently serving the
needs of their fellow man, particularly those of the common
man. Just a casual review of economic history shows that in
the rise of capitalism, the production and trade of silks, ex-
otic perfumes, rare spices and other goods to pamper the rich
did not yield the largest fortunes. Instead, trade of goods
used by the common man, such as woolens, cotton, tea, sugar
and coffee, yielded great wealth.
Capitalism has a strong bias toward serving the common
man. Henry Ford, who produced cars for the common man,
amassed a much larger fortune than Bentley, who made cars
for the rich. Companies which produce music to fit the tastes
of the masses earn more than those which pamper the musi-
cal tastes of the elite. The parity in the marketplace, nonexis-
tent in the political arena, could be the chief reason that the
elite do not favor free markets. Political allocation of re-
sources is, and always has been, strongly biased in favor of
the elite.1 2
12. So-called "public" television is a good example. Commercial,
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Intellectual Foundations for Totalitarianism
The real tragedy of the bishops' letter is that it contains
features which are the intellectual foundations of totalitarian-
ism. Nobel laureate Friedrich A. Hayek argued in his 1944
bestseller, The Road to Serfdom, that many totalitarian govern-
ments result from the attempt to put socialist ideas into oper-
ation. The focal point of Hayek's thesis was Nazi Germany.
Hayek argued that it was wrong to explain the horrors of
Naziism by suggesting that Germans had some sort of con-
genital defect which caused them to commit unprecedented
human savagery. To say Germans were inherently vicious,
Hayek says,
dishonors the long series of Anglo-Saxon thinkers who dur-
ing the last one hundred years have gladly taken over what
was best, and not only what was best, in German thought. It
overlooks the fact that when John Stuart Mill was writing
his great essay On Liberty he drew his inspiration, more than
from any other men, from two Germans, Goethe and Wil-
helm von Humboldt. .... 1.
Popular recollection of Jews in Germany focuses on the
holocaust where over six million were slaughtered. However,
in the decades prior to the collapse of the Weimar Republic,
Germany was one of the most hospitable places for Jews
throughout their history of persecution. Jews were dispropor-
tionately represented in German arts, sciences and the press.
Furthermore, they played a role in politics. They were 1% of
the population, but they were 10% of doctors and dentists,
17% of the lawyers, and they won 27% of Nobel laureates
won by Germans between 1905 and 1975.
market-oriented, or what is derisively called capitalistic television is domi-
nated by shows that cater to common tastes, such as "Phil Donahue,"
"Johnny Carson," "Archie Bunker," "Silver Spoons," and a host of soap
operas. Futhermore, commercial television presents sports preferred by the
common man, such as baseball, basketball, wrestling and football.
Commercial television does not pamper elite tastes. The elite satisfy their
tastes by using government to tax the "common man" for "public broad-
casting." By doing so, the elite have their shows such as "Poldark," "Up-
stairs, Downstairs," "Bolshoi," "MacNeil-Lehrer," and the "Boston Pops."
"Public" television also allows the elite to view their sports such as cricket,
tennis, and horsemanship. Further, elite children have "public" television
to air "Sesame Street," and "Mister Rogers' Neighborhood," while com-
mercial television provides the commoners' shows such as "Roadrunner"
and "Bugs Bunny." See T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 364-65
(1980).
13. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 5 (1944).
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German respect for persecuted minorities went beyond
its borders. "German immigrants in early America likewise
acquired a reputation for their ability to get along with
American Indians. Germans also held the first anti-slavery
meetings in America in the eighteenth century and were fer-
vent supporters of Lincoln and the emancipation of blacks in
the nineteenth century.""'
If we accept that Germans are no more congenitally vi-
cious than other nationalities, then what happened in Ger-
man society to foster the rise of Naziism? Hayek explains,
It is significant that most important ancestors of National
Socialism [Naziism]-Fichte, Rodbertus and Lassalle-are
at the same time acknowledged fathers of socialism. While
theoretical socialism in its Marxist form was directing the
German labour movement, the authoritarian and national-
ist element receded for a time into the background ....
From 1914 onwards there arose from the ranks of Marxist
socialism one teacher after another who led, not the con-
servatives and reactionaries, but the hardworking labourer
and idealist youth into the National Socialist fold.' 1 5
Hayek continues,
The "German idea" of the state, as formulated by Fichte,
Lassalle and Rodbertus, is that the state is neither founded
nor formed by individuals, nor an aggregate of individuals,
nor is its purpose to serve any interest of individuals. It is a
Volksgemeinschaft in which the individual has no rights but
only duties."
While the intellectual foundations of totalitarianism had
been laid, we must understand the reason that Naziism
moved across the country at a lightning-like pace. The social
democrats of the Weimar Republic created the elaborate su-
perstructure needed by the Nazis for successful policy.
Schuettinger and Butler argue: "More explicitly, the carte-
lization of the economy, state control of the banks, ownership
of a sizeable fraction of industry, regulation of many aspects
of business activity, incorporation of labor into organized
units with central control working closely with government
and intervention in foreign trade-all existed before
14. T. SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 254 (1983).
15. F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at 125.
16. Id. at 126.
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Hitler."'"
One of the clearest statements of the intellectual founda-
tion of Naziism is by Paul Lensch, in his most successful
book, Three Years of World Revolution. Lensch says the follow-
ing about the opposition in Germany to the coming socialism:
This class of people, who unconsciously reason from En-
glish standards, comprises the whole German bourgeoisie.
Their political notions of "freedom" and "civic right", of
constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, are derived from
that individualistic conception of the world, of which En-
glish Liberalism is a classical embodiment, and which was
adopted by the spokesmen of the German bourgeoisie in
the 'fifties, 'sixties and 'seventies of the nineteenth century.
But these standards are old-fashioned and shattered, just as
old-fashioned English Liberalism has been shattered by this
war [World War I]. What has to be done now is to get rid
of these inherited political ideas and to assist the growth of
a new conception of State and Society. In this sphere also
Socialism must present a conscious and determined opposition
to individualism.18
In a nutshell, Nazi philosophy is expressed in the slogan,
Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz, (the common good comes
before the private good). This sentiment was expressed by
Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf:
The Aryan is not greatest in his mental qualities as such,
but in the extent of his willingness to put all his abilities in
the service of the community. In him the instinct of self-
preservation has reached the noblest form, since he willingly
subordinates his own ego to the community and, if the hour de-
mands, even sacrifices it."
Comparing the Bishops
The bishops' letter contains many calls and admonish-
ments for the subordination of the individual to the commu-
nity: "There are forms of individual and group selfishness
17. R. SCHUETTINGER & E. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES OF WAGE AND
PRICE CONTROLS: How Not TO FIGHT INFLATION 66 (1979).
18. P. LENSCH, THREE YEARS OF WORLD REVOLUTION (1918), quoted in
F. HAYEK, supra note 13, at 130-31 (emphasis added).
19. A. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 297 (R. Manheim trans. 1943), cited in L.
PEIKOFF, THE OMINOUS PARALLELS: THE END OF FREEDOM OF AMERICA 66
(1982) (emphasis added).
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present in the nation that undermine social solidarity and ef-
forts to protect the economic rights of all."20 Citing Pius XI,
the bishops write: "It is of the very essence of social justice to
demand from each individual all that is necessary for the com-
mon good."2 In their view of the principles that should be set
for America, the bishops note: "They call our country to
build on its past achievements and to direct its economy onto
paths which will better serve both the national and interna-
tional common good.' 22 In reference to responsibility of gov-
ernment, the bishops add, "Catholic social thought has long
held that one of government's prime tasks is the coordination
and regulation of the activities of diverse groups in society in
a way that leads to the common good and the protection of
basic rights. 23
Pursuit of "social justice" and the "common good" is a
recurring theme in the bishops' letter. At the same time, the
bishops express ambiguity about the role of government:
"While affirming the positive role of government, Catholic
social thought does not advocate a statist approach to eco-
nomic policy. It resists excessive concentration of power in
the hands of government, for this can itself threaten human
rights and justice. 24
The bishops' ambiguity is indeed the dilemma faced by
man. The pursuit of socialistic or collectivist goals has always
required concentration of power in the hands of government.
The basic nature of man is that he will not relinquish his
property, his income and his pursuit of material gain to the
extent demanded by socialists and collectivists. Therefore,
extensive force is required to subordinate individual liberties,
such as private property rights, freedom of movement, free-
dom of contract, freedom of speech and and the freedom of
work, to the will of the elite who establish an all-powerful
government.
Subordination of individual liberties lies at the heart of
what has come to be known as industrial planning. Industrial
planning is nothing more than the forcible superseding of
20. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 85.
21. Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris, no. 51 (1937), cited in Pastoral Letter,
supra note 4, para. 95 (emphasis added). See Second Draft, supra note 4,
para. 75.
22. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 107 (emphasis added).
23. Id. para. 124 (emphasis added). See Second Draft, supra note 4,
para. 119.
24. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 127. See Second Draft, supra
note 4, para. 118, 122.
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someone else's plan by the powerful elite. For example, one
person plans to use some of his earnings to buy clothing.
Powerful government says, "No, that part of your earnings
will be sent to the IRS and be used for food stamps or busi-
ness subsidies." One person plans to buy a Honda. Powerful
government says, "No, the 'common good' requires that you
buy a Ford." A refrigerator manufacturer plans to buy his
sheet metal from an inexpensive Belgian firm rather than
from an expensive domestic producer. Powerful government
says, "No, in order to have a 'just society,' where there is full
employment for American steelworkers, we are going to
force you to buy your sheet metal from a domestic
producer."
There is nothing more common in the history of man
than the notion that we must restrain or eliminate voluntary
transactions in order to pursue the "common good." Sup-
pression of personal liberty is an inevitable consequence of
the attempt to implement socialist goals.
Alexis de Tocqueville captured the essentials of demo-
cratic societies versus socialistic ones: "Democracy attaches all
possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere
agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism have noth-
ing in common but one word: equality. But notice the differ-
ence. While democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism
seeks equality in restraint and servitude."25
Collusions Against the Poor
The bishops' letter correctly argues that there are unac-
ceptable levels of unemployment, dependence and poverty in
the United States. The bishops fail to recognize, however,
that federal, state and local government policies cause or ag-
gravate the problem. On the one hand, these government
policies are advocated by decent people who are misguided
or misinformed. On the other hand, they are also advocated
by people seeking to promote personal economic interests at
the expense of the politically and economically weak or disor-
ganized segments of our society. More tragic than politicians'
susceptibility to powerful interest groups (often to the disad-
vantage of the weak) is that these interest groups successfully
enlist the support of decent people to achieve selfish, collu-
25. De Tocqueville, Speech in the Constituent Assembly (September
12, 1848), in J. BARTLETT, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 506 (E.M.
Beck ed. 1980).
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sive goals.
Formula for Collusion
The reason that collusions are so successfully formed is
that good people do not understand them and hence fall easy
prey to charlatans and economic manipulators. Therefore,
we may gain profitable understanding from a brief discussion
of collusions.
Collusive activity is an attempt, most often by sellers of a
product or service, to restrict competition. The product of
restricted competition is the ability to charge higher prices
(interest, rent, wages and profits) as a means to higher in-
come. The target of collusive strategy is always another ac-
tual or potential seller. Sellers always find opportunities to
raise their prices if they can limit either the output of com-
petitors or the number of substitutes for their products.
A drug manufacturer's competitors are other drug manu-
facturers. It can charge monopoly prices and earn monopoly
income if it can politically reduce competition. The means to
achieve this goal are numerous. An exclusive franchise may
be sought from the government to be the only seller in a
market. The entry cost to potential competitors may be
raised by pressing the legislature for licensing laws that re-
strict the number of sellers, or laws that impose onerous en-
try requirements. The manufacturer may also seek laws that
set minimum prices for a product. The stated intention for
such measures will usually be couched in public spirited lan-
guage, such as "to promote the public health, safety and wel-
fare," while the effect of the measures is to restrict
competition.
An especially effective strategy for collusion is to set min-
imum prices through political intervention. Tariffs on im-
ported goods are a widely known device for reducing foreign
competition. Domestic producers faced with competition
from foreign producers find that if the prices of imported
products can be politically raised through tariffs, they can
charge higher prices for their products. In recent years,
United States auto manufacturers have sought higher tariffs
on Japanese autos. The tariff (tax) raises the price of Japa-
nese-produced autos to the benefit of domestic producers.
Quite often, as was the case with autos, labor unions po-
litically support manufacturer initiatives to lobby for import
tariffs. Unions help because import tariffs serve the interests
of their members. Restricted foreign competition brings
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higher product prices; higher prices mean that labor unions
can negotiate higher wages and secure higher employment
for their members. 6
Youth Unemployment: A Union Collusion
No one will disagree with the bishops' comment,
"[a]mong black teen-agers aged 16 to 19 who are seeking
jobs unemployment reaches the tragic figure of 41.7 percent,
while for blacks aged 20 to 24 it is a discouraging 26.3 per-
cent. '27 In all the national debate on teenage unemployment,
little attention is paid to statistics from earlier periods. In the
late forties and early fifties, black teenage unemployment was
either equal to or less than white teen unemployment. Fur-
thermore, blacks in every age group were more active in the
world of work than whites.2 8
The massive decrease in employment opportunities for
black teenagers cannot be explained by allegations of racial
discrimination. The answer is simple. Teenagers in general,
and black teenagers in particular, are the victims of govern-
ment-backed collusion. The minimum wage law of the Fair
Labor Standards Act is the tool.
When we analyze the minimum wage law, we must look
at its effect and not its stated intent. Its effect is clear if we put
ourselves in the place of employers and ask: "If I must pay
$3.35 per hour, is it worth it to hire the worker who has
skills that permit him to produce only $2.00 worth of output
per hour?" Most employers would find that this would be a
losing proposition. Therefore, the effect of the minimum
wage law is to discriminate against employment of low-skilled
workers. However, such a worker could be employed, and re-
ceive on-the-job training, if he could be paid $2.00 per hour,
the value of his output.
Laws that discriminate against low-skilled workers will
naturally have their greatest impact on teenagers. Teenagers,
lacking experience, maturity and employment stability, are
disproportionately represented in the low-skilled end of the
labor market. For reasons such as low socioeconomic charac-
teristics and grossly inferior primary and secondary school-
ing, black teenagers are disproportionately represented
26. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 1 (especially ch. 14).
27. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 162. See Second Draft, supra
note 4, para. 139.
28. See, STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
YOUTH AND MINORITY UNEMPLOYMENT (Comm. Print 1977).
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among low-skill teens.
The small income that a teenager could earn from part-
time work pales in comparison to what he learns from that
work. Early work experiences teach young people prompt-
ness, respect for supervisors, and job location skills. All of
these lessons make the teenager a more valuable worker in
the future regardless of the job in which he learns these les-
sons. Moreover, early work experiences give young people a
sense of pride and self-respect that results from some degree
of financial independence.
Decent people support the minimum wage law because
they think it will help the teenager, the poor and the low
skilled. But the people who back their support for the mini-
mum wage law with millions of lobby dollars are labor un-
ions. Most members of labor unions earn considerably more
than the minimum wage. Such a "sense of concern" for low-
skilled workers may be perplexing, but it is understandable
when one considers the principles of collusive strategy and
the fact that low-skilled workers can be substituted for higher
skilled workers.
Consider an employer who can produce 100 yards of
fence per day by using either one of two productive tech-
niques. The first technique requires that he employ one high-
skilled worker at a daily wage of $38. The second technique
requires that he employ three low-skilled workers to whom
he would pay $13 each, per day, making labor costs $39. In
order to maximize profits, the employer would minimize
costs by using the first technique - he would hire the high-
skilled worker and pay $38 in wages.
If the high-skilled worker were to demand a higher
wage, perhaps $55 per day, the employer would switch to the
second technique and hire the three low-skilled workers at a
cost of $39. After all, the employer can produce 100 yards of
fence with either technique.
The high-skilled worker would correctly anticipate the
employer's response to a demand for higher wages. There-
fore, it would pay the worker to organize with others like
himself to politically control the labor market. The organiza-
tion would lobby Congress for a minimum wage in the fenc-
ing industry. They would plead for moral backing for politi-
cal intervention as follows: "Employers exploit low-skilled
workers with a $13 wage" and "A decent standard of living
demands a decent wage." With the help of church groups
and civic organizations, the labor organization may persuade
Congress to enact a $20 per day minimum wage in the fenc-
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ing industry.
The statutory minimum wage means that the second
technique, employing three low-skilled workers, now costs
$60. After the minimum wage law has passed, the high-
skilled worker can demand $55 per day and have a greater
chance of keeping his job. His success is a direct result of his
organization's ability to use the government to price lower-
skilled and lower-priced competition out of the market.
A minimum wage law does not require a discriminatory
intent to have this discriminatory effect. Most Americans
would not lend their political support if employment discrimi-
nation against the poor and low-skilled was the stated inten-
tion behind the minimum wage law. However, at earlier
times in the United States labor movement, discrimination
against black, low-skilled workers was the stated intention for
minimum wage laws via the mechanism of collective bargain-
ing laws. 9 In South Africa, the stated intention of racist un-
ions behind their support for minimum wage laws, called
"rate for the job," is to discriminate against low-skill, low-
wage, black workers."
Truth Versus Rhetoric
The establishment of laws that mandate higher-than-
market prices always represent a seller collusion. Despite the
cry that "Labor is not a commodity," which was used to ex-
empt unions from prosecution under the provisions of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the laws of supply and demand apply
to labor services as well as to any other good or service. How-
ever, since unions "sell" labor services, they would have us
believe that economic laws do not apply to labor as they do to
non-human items like cars, clothing and foods. Such a posi-
tion is analogous to a refutation of the law of gravity as ap-
plied to humans by the cry, "Man is not an object!"
It is interesting, however, to note the differences in can-
dor when labor unions lobby to politically raise the price of
foreign cars and when they lobby to raise the price of labor.
When unions lobby Congress to politically raise wages, they
say lobby for the poor, the disadvantaged and the teenager.
29. Equal pay for equal work, collective bargaining established wage
minima, and so-called "comparable worth" produce the same economic ef-
fects as the minimum wage law. See W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST
BLACKS 103-07 (1982).
30. Id. at 43-44; W. HuTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR
(1964).
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However, when they lobby to politically raise the price of
Japanese autos, they do not mention a desire to help the Jap-
anese. In the case of raising the price of cars, unions are hon-
est in emphasizing that they wish to help secure more em-
ployment and higher wages for the members of their unions.
More Hurtful Policies
There are many government policies that hurt the poor.
Most of them, in one way or another, are characterized by
provisions that make entry to jobs prohibitively expensive.
They set artificial qualifications or demand qualifications that
are unattainable and that therefore banish the job. Poor peo-
ple who own cars could, for example, go into the taxi busi-
ness. But in most cities, they would have to buy a license that
could cost up to $65,000.1 They could find work as hair-
dressers, landscapers or as other sorts of tradesmen; but they
need a license. Many licensing tests require knowledge which
has little or nothing to do with the ability to adequately per-
form the skills of the trade."2 Certain jobs, like that of a
street peddler, are banned in some cities, and where they are
not banned, the authorities harass the peddlers. Street ped-
dlers have followed a traditional American avenue for up-
ward mobility. If the authorities had banned such street ped-
dlers as Gimbel, B. Altman, J.C. Penney, John Wanamaker,
Levi Strauss, Richard Sears, and Marshall Field, one wonders
what would have become of their futures.
Some policies are harmful to the poor in more insidious
and hypocritical ways. Over the last year, there has been con-
siderable debate, charges and counter-charges, gnashing of
the teeth, and the wringing of hands over the issue of hunger
in America. Politicians are always anxious to take the stand
and condemn the presence of hunger in this land of plenty.
No matter how persuasive their oratory, there is a ring of
emptiness to their pleas when one considers the activities of
the same politicians in the privacy of their offices. Most sena-
tors and congressmen, under the influence of strong pressure
groups, vote for hundreds of laws that call for agricultural
price supports, acreage restrictions, agricultural import re-
strictions, collusive marketing boards, dairy price supports
and many other political manipulations of the food industry.
Whatever the intentions behind the political manipula-
31. W. WILLIAMS, supra note 29, ch. 6.
32. Id. ch. 5.
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tion of the food industry, the effect is to raise the price of
food. There is no question that government policies which
raise the price of food have an adverse effect on the poor and
hurt consumers in general. Perhaps even more tragic, the
policy leads to billions of dollars worth of surplus food, much
of it rotting, while millions in the world starve to death.
Conclusion
On the whole, the bishops' letter is an exercise in fan-
tasy. Much of what the bishops say has merit only if we view
the attainment of Utopia, or a heaven-on-earth, as a real pos-
sibility. But, of course, no such possibility exists. Therefore,
man is left to choose the best system among the actual alter-.
natives that face him. Whatever the critics may say of capital-
ism, the undeniable fact is that capitalism has done the best
job of solving man's traditional problems, such as famine, dis-
ease, and gross poverty. The fact that capitalism wins hands
down in comparison to any other system does not mean that
we do not have problems in America. But, as suggested
throughout this discussion, capitalism has been the most suc-
cessful system in the history of mankind in bringing him the
material means for his spiritual development.
The bishops truly demean and insult this moral and spiri-
tual achievement when they say, "There are forms of individ-
ual and group selfishness present in the nation that under-
mine social solidarity and efforts to protect the economic
rights of all." 8 Such an accusation does not square with the
facts of American generosity. "Few aspects of American soci-
ety are more characteristically or more famously American
than the nation's array of voluntary organizations, and the
support in both time and money that is given to them by its
citizens. ' 84 According to Commission estimates, Americans
gave more than $50 billion in money, time and labor in
1974." 6 More recent estimates set American giving at more
than $62 billion, most of which comes in small amounts from
many private individuals.
Americans have always been generous, as evidenced by
the fact that the world's greatest philanthropic organizations
began in the United States, including the Carnegie, Rockefel-
ler and Ford Foundations. In world disasters, the American
33. Pastoral Letter, supra note 4, para. 85.
34. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING
IN AMERICA 9 (1975).
35. Id. at 10.
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Red Cross is often first on the scene with needed medical sup-
plies and food. Of all the giving in the world, Americans do
eighty percent of it.
For the bishops to say that there are forms of "individual
and group selfishness" implies that Americans are somehow
deficient in their generosity. In this respect, the bishops must
answer the question: Americans are selfish compared to
what? But a greater affront to American generosity is the
bishops' ingratitude, manifested by the fact that religious or-
ganizations are the greatest recipients of most American
generosity.
A society that produces plenty for its members is not a
result of good intentions and charity. It is a result of individ-
ual members having the private incentives to do voluntarily
those things consistent with the social good. Motivated by the
pursuit of private gain, which the bishops denounce as greed,
individuals promote the public welfare.
Adam Smith, who wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776, a
treatise just as important to our young nation as the Declara-
tion of Independence, pointed out the virtues of voluntary
relationships among men and the pursuit of wealth:
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.. . . [H]e
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry
in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this . . .
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention. . . By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for the
public good. 6
Indeed, in a free society, personal wealth is evidence that
one has promoted the public good. People who have pro-
duced items from computers and airplanes to Barbie Dolls
and designer jeans became wealthy because they pleased
others. Too often, wealthy people are ridiculed and scorned
while non-productive people are idolized. It does not require
much imagination to predict the ominous direction for the
nation if we punish the productive and honor the non-
productive.
36. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (1st ed. London 1776).
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